The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
On January 15, 2015, the Swiss National Bank announced it would stop defending a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 francs per euro. Within minutes, EUR/CHF fell from around 1.20 to below 0.90 at the low, before recovering partially.
For three years, the bank had capped the franc's strength, and the policy had appeared permanent. Traders treated the floor as a certainty, and many held leveraged positions assuming the pair could not fall.
The aftermath was severe. Stops failed to execute at their levels because liquidity vanished. Accounts went deeply negative. Several brokers suffered large losses, and some became insolvent or required rescue, while clients elsewhere owed money.
The lessons are lasting. First, policies that look permanent can change without warning. Second, the risk was visible: a floor held by central bank intervention is a bet that the central bank will keep spending. Third, stops are not guarantees in a gap. Fourth, leverage amplifies unknown unknowns.
The event also showed how counterparty risk becomes real in extreme events.
You cannot predict specific shocks, but you can structure your exposure assuming that one will arrive. Keep sizes moderate, avoid concentrating in pegged or capped currencies, and favor regulated brokers.
Practical step: list any positions or strategies you hold that depend on a policy or peg remaining in place, and ask what happens if it ends overnight.
The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
The part that sticks with me is how calm it looked beforehand. EUR/CHF was one of the quietest pairs around, sitting near 1.20 for ages. Low volatility made people think it was safe, and that's what let them oversize.
It’s Fairman 
Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
It also changed how a lot of traders choose brokers. Negative balance protection went from something nobody read about to one of the first things people check, and for good reason.
It’s Fairman 
Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
Useful exercise from this: for every position you hold, ask what happens if price gaps 10 percent through your stop. If the answer is that you lose more than you can afford, the position is too big, whatever the chart says.
It’s Fairman 
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FXS Prop Desk
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Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
The case is a reminder that stops are not guaranteed. Many traders saw their stops filled hundreds of pips away, and some brokers went out of business.
The practical lesson for scalpers is to know the broker's negative balance protection policy and to avoid holding positions in pairs with a central bank floor or peg. Those pairs can move very little for months and then move enormously in minutes.
The practical lesson for scalpers is to know the broker's negative balance protection policy and to avoid holding positions in pairs with a central bank floor or peg. Those pairs can move very little for months and then move enormously in minutes.
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Shadow Trader
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Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
The 10 percent gap test above is worth running on the actual event. Say a long EURCHF at 1.2010 with a 60 pip stop at 1.1950, sized so the stop equals 1 percent of the account.
If that stop filled at 1.0000, the loss was 2,010 pips instead of 60, about 33 times the planned risk. At 1 percent per stop, that is roughly a third of the account gone on one trade.
Some fills that morning were reportedly worse than 1.0000, so the example is not an extreme case. The planned risk figure had almost nothing to do with the real one.
The SNB also cut its deposit rate from minus 0.25 to minus 0.75 percent that day. Long EURCHF had looked like a calm way to lean on a floor, and the low volatility mentioned above made bigger size feel safe.
For scalpers, the lesson extends to any pair whose range is held down by policy. A quiet pair and a safe pair are not the same thing.
When a pair's daily range shrinks to a fraction of its usual size for months, does anyone here cut size? Or does it get treated as a sign the pair has become safer?
If that stop filled at 1.0000, the loss was 2,010 pips instead of 60, about 33 times the planned risk. At 1 percent per stop, that is roughly a third of the account gone on one trade.
Some fills that morning were reportedly worse than 1.0000, so the example is not an extreme case. The planned risk figure had almost nothing to do with the real one.
The SNB also cut its deposit rate from minus 0.25 to minus 0.75 percent that day. Long EURCHF had looked like a calm way to lean on a floor, and the low volatility mentioned above made bigger size feel safe.
For scalpers, the lesson extends to any pair whose range is held down by policy. A quiet pair and a safe pair are not the same thing.
When a pair's daily range shrinks to a fraction of its usual size for months, does anyone here cut size? Or does it get treated as a sign the pair has become safer?
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Shadow Trader
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Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
There is a mechanical reason the quiet years led to oversizing, and it catches anyone sizing by recent volatility. ATR based rules set the stop at a multiple of the average range, so a sleepy pair gets a tight stop and a big position.
Say EURCHF had an hourly ATR of 15 pips while EURUSD sat near 80. With a stop at 1.5 times ATR, that is 22.5 pips against 120, so the same 1 percent risk buys more than five times the position on the franc cross.
Run a 2,000 pip gap through that sizing and the loss comes to about 89 times what was planned. At 1 percent a trade, the account is close to wiped out.
Two caps would have helped. One is to size off the larger of the current ATR and a two year average, so a quiet spell cannot shrink the stop below normal. The other is a hard notional limit, say never more than 2 times the account on one pair.
At 2 times notional, a move of about 17 percent costs roughly 33 percent of the account. That hurts, but it is survivable.
Does anyone here run a notional cap alongside stop based sizing? It is the one rule that still works when the stop does not.
Say EURCHF had an hourly ATR of 15 pips while EURUSD sat near 80. With a stop at 1.5 times ATR, that is 22.5 pips against 120, so the same 1 percent risk buys more than five times the position on the franc cross.
Run a 2,000 pip gap through that sizing and the loss comes to about 89 times what was planned. At 1 percent a trade, the account is close to wiped out.
Two caps would have helped. One is to size off the larger of the current ATR and a two year average, so a quiet spell cannot shrink the stop below normal. The other is a hard notional limit, say never more than 2 times the account on one pair.
At 2 times notional, a move of about 17 percent costs roughly 33 percent of the account. That hurts, but it is survivable.
Does anyone here run a notional cap alongside stop based sizing? It is the one rule that still works when the stop does not.
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Shadow Trader
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Re: The Swiss Franc Shock of 2015: A Case Study in Hidden Risk
In January 2015, the Swiss National Bank abruptly removed its currency floor against the euro. The franc surged by thousands of pips within minutes, liquidity vanished, and many brokers suffered severe losses. Several went bankrupt or required rescue, and many clients lost more than their deposits.
The event demonstrated that stops are not guarantees. In the absence of liquidity, orders fill at whatever price is available, or not at all. Positions that seemed safely protected produced catastrophic losses.
For scalpers, the main lessons are practical. Policy-managed pegs carry hidden risk, since their removal can occur without warning. Broker solvency matters, since a broker's failure can lock up client funds. Leverage amplifies tail events. Maintaining modest leverage, diversifying across brokers, and monitoring policy-managed currencies reduces exposure. While such events are rare, planning for them, rather than assuming they cannot happen, is what separates durable traders from those who eventually face a catastrophic loss.
The event demonstrated that stops are not guarantees. In the absence of liquidity, orders fill at whatever price is available, or not at all. Positions that seemed safely protected produced catastrophic losses.
For scalpers, the main lessons are practical. Policy-managed pegs carry hidden risk, since their removal can occur without warning. Broker solvency matters, since a broker's failure can lock up client funds. Leverage amplifies tail events. Maintaining modest leverage, diversifying across brokers, and monitoring policy-managed currencies reduces exposure. While such events are rare, planning for them, rather than assuming they cannot happen, is what separates durable traders from those who eventually face a catastrophic loss.